The Value of Truth / The Truth of Value - LED Edizioni Universitarie

The Value of Truth / The Truth of Value
Proceedings of the International Seminar "Nomologics 1".
Pavia, Residenza Golgi, 14th-16th July 2011

Edited by Stefano Colloca

Collana: «Nomologica» 4
16 x 23,5 cm – pp. 208 – 2013 – € 32,50
ISBN 978-88-7916-644-7

CONTENTS: Preface. The Autochthony of the Normative, Stefano Colloca and Paolo Di Lucia — Saluto introduttivo. Una riflessione sull’idea di naturae veritas, Valerio Marotta — I. Truth: 1. Vero de dicto vs. vero de actu, Amedeo Giovanni Conte — 2. Anselmo d’Aosta/Anselm of Canterbury: la duplice duplicità del vero, Paolo Di Lucia — 3. The Truth of Value, Matjaž Potrč — 4. La confutazione del relativismo, John R. Searle — 5. Truth-Value and Self-Reference. Against the Spectre of the ‘Revenge Liar’, Wojciech Żełaniec — II. Value: 6. Two Arguments for Axiological Scepticism, Stefano Colloca — 7. Sullo scetticismo pratico e il cognitivismo assiologico, Roberta De Monticelli — 8. La verità come valore logico, Giuseppe Lorini — 9. Valori personali e valori impersonali. Sulla teoria dei valori di Alexius Meinong, Venanzio Raspa — III. Norm: 10. Eidetica e normatività in Edmund Husserl, Francesca De Vecchi — 11. Norm Atrophy and Nomotrophic Behaviour: on a Mode of Inexistence of Norms, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel — 12. Mimetic Boundaries of Constitutive Rules, Corrado Roversi — 13. Repeal, Money (M1), Institutional Entities: Some Thoughts on Corrado Roversi’s Mimetic “Constitutive” Rules, Edoardo Fittipaldi — The Authors — Index of Proper Names

The relationship between truth and value is still a challenging question at the beginning of the 21st century in philosophy of law, ethics, nomologics and philosophical deontics. All the papers presented in this book deal with this question and can be roughly said to address two different problems, or two problem areas.
First problem area. The distinction between Is and Ought (Sein and Sollen, description and prescription, ontic and deontic domain) is well-known in philosophy and semiotics: judgments concerning truth seem to belong to the ontic domain, while judgments concerning values seem to belong to the deontic domain. However, is there a relationship between judgments concerning truth (truth-judgments) and judgments concerning values (value-judgments)?
Second problem area. Traditionally, descriptive sentences (or propositions) are said to have a truth-value (or value of truth). However, is it possible to speak meaningfully of a truth-value also in the normative and axiological fields? And is it possible to conceive an análogon of truth for the normative and axiological fields?

Stefano Colloca (Pavia, 1977) teaches Legal Interpretation and Ethics and Deontology of Communication at the University of Pavia, where he is a researcher in Philosophy of Law. His writings include two monographs (Autoriferimento e antinomia nell’ordinamento giuridico, 2006; Il problema dei limiti alla produzione normativa, 2012) and several articles concerning the theory of legal system and the philosophy of normative language.

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